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Imaginary Foundations
WOLFGANG SCHWARZ
University of Edinburgh
Our senses provide us with information about the world, but what exactly do they
tell us? I argue that in order to optimally respond to sensory stimulations, an agent’s
doxastic space may have an extra, “imaginary” dimension of possibility; perceptual
experiences confer certainty on propositions in this dimension. To some extent,
the resulting picture vindicates the old-fashioned empiricist idea that all empirical
knowledge is based on a solid foundation of sense-datum propositions, but it avoids
most of the problems traditionally associated with that idea. The proposal might also
explain why experiences appear to have a non-physical phenomenal character, even if
the world is entirely physical.
1. Learning from Experience
Through the window I can see that it is still raining. A stream of water is running
down the street into the gutters. But can I tell, just be looking, that it is water?
Couldn’t it be a stream of vodka? To be sure, that is an outlandish possibility. But
if for whatever reason I had taken the vodka hypothesis seriously before looking
outside, my visual experience wouldn’t put me in a position to rule it out. So
if we define the information provided by my visual experience in terms of the
possibilities the experience allows me to rule out, then the information I receive
from my senses does not entail that there is a stream of water on the road. Nor
does it entail that it is raining. What looks like rain could be a setup for a movie
scene. My windows could have been replaced with sophisticated LCD screens.
Again, my visual experience by itself does not put me in a position to rule out
these possibilities.
This line of thought naturally leads to the old empiricist idea that the infor-
mation we receive from our senses is in the first place information not about the
external world, but about a special, luminous, internal realm of appearances or
sense data: the possibilities I can rule out are all and only the possibilities in
which things do not appear as they actually do. Yet this view also faces problems.
Aren’t we often ignorant or mistaken about how things appear? How could
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everything we know about the world be inferred from facts about appearance?
How are appearance facts supposed to fit into a naturalistic account of the mind?
There are other ways of defining the information provided by an experience.
For example, if my experience is in fact caused by rain, and experiences of the
same type are caused by rain across a variety of nearby worlds, then there is
a good (causal) sense in which my experience carries the information that it
is raining. But it is not clear how this sense of information bears on how the
experience should change my beliefs. After all, I should not become absolutely
certain that it is raining. With suitable background beliefs, my credence in the
rain hypothesis should even decrease.
So perhaps we should drop the assumption that perceptual experiences put us
in a position to conclusively exclude possibilities. Instead, my experience, perhaps
together with my background beliefs, merely allows me to conclude tentatively
and defeasibly that it is raining. In general, on this view, experiences combine
with background beliefs to confer degrees of plausibility or probability to various
claims about the world, without making anything certain.
But things are not so easy. To bring out why, let’s try to model the present idea
in the framework of Bayesian epistemology. Here we assume that beliefs come in
degrees that satisfy the mathematical conditions on a probability measure. How
should these probabilities change under the impact of perceptual experience?
Classical Bayesianism suggests the following answer. For each type of perceptual
experience there is a proposition E such that, whenever a rational agent has the
experience, her new probability equals her previous probability conditional on E;
that is, for all A,
Pnew(A) = Pold(A/E) = Pold(A ∧ E)/Pold(E), provided Pold(E) > 0.
Here, Pnew is said to come from Pold by conditionalizing on E.1 Since Pold(E/E) = 1,
the new probability of E is 1. So E can hardly be an ordinary proposition about
the world. Again, we seem forced to postulate a mysterious realm of sense-datum
propositions.
To avoid commitment to such propositions, Richard Jeffrey developed what
he called radical probabilism as an alternative to the classical Bayesian picture (see
Jeffrey 1965: Chapter 11; 1992). Radical probabilism rejects the idea that subjective
probabilities require a bedrock of certainty. To use a well-known example from
Jeffrey (1965), imagine you catch a glimpse of a tablecloth in a poorly lit room.
According to Jeffrey, the direct effect of this experience on your beliefs may be
that you come to assign credence 0.6 to the hypothesis that the cloth is green and
0.4 to the hypothesis that it is blue; these probabilistic judgments need not be
inferred from anything that has become certain.
1. The conditional probabilities Pold(A/E) are often computed via Bayes’ Theorem, which
is why conditionalization is also known as Bayes’ Rule.
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In general, Jeffrey’s model assumes that an experience is directly relevant to
some propositions and not to others. Suppose E1, . . . , En is a list of pairwise exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive propositions whose probabilities change in response
to an experience so that their new probabilities are x1, . . . , xn respectively. If the
experience is directly relevant only to E1, . . . , En, then probabilities conditional on
these propositions should be preserved. It follows that the new probability of any
proposition A is given by
Pnew(A) =∑
i
Pold(A/Ei) · xi.
This transformation from Pold to Pnew is known as Jeffrey conditionalization.2
At first glance, Jeffrey’s model seems to deliver just what we were looking for.
Instead of assuming that each type of perceptual experience is associated with a
sense-datum proposition E rendered certain by the experience, we only need to
assume that there is some assignment of probabilities x1, . . . , xn to the elements
of some partition E1, . . . , En of ordinary propositions such that, when a rational
agent has the experience then her degrees of belief evolve by the corresponding
instance of Jeffrey conditionalization.
More concretely, we might assume that for every perceptual experience there
is a proposition E that captures how the experience intuitively represents the
world as being. We do not require agents to become absolutely certain of E when
they have the experience. Instead, we might say that they should assign some
intermediate credence x (maybe 0.95) to E, and consequently 1−x to ¬E. The
complete update is then determined by the following special case of Jeffrey’s rule:
Pnew(A) = Pold(A/E) · x+ Pold(A/¬E) · (1− x).
We would still need to explain why this response is justified: why it is OK to
tentatively assume that the world is as it appears to be. But at least we seem to
have a structurally sound model of belief change that frees us from the implausible
commitments of the classical model.
Unfortunately, the present model won’t do either—not if experiences are indi-
viduated by their physiology or phenomenology.3 For then the rational response
to a given experience should depend on the agent’s background information. Your
new beliefs about the colour of the tablecloth, for instance, should be sensitive to
background beliefs about the colour of other tablecloths in the house. My belief
2. For ease of exposition, I have assumed that the experience is directly relevant only to a
finite partition E1, . . . , En ; the model is easily extended to infinite cases; see Diaconis and Zabell
(1982: Section 6).
3. Experiences can of course be typed in other ways. For example, we might say that
two experiences are of the same type iff they lead to the same rational posterior beliefs. The
difficulties I am going to discuss then resurface as the problem of determining when two
experiences are of the same type.
Ergo · vol. 5, no. 29 · 2018
Imaginary Foundations · 767
about the weather should be sensitive to background beliefs about whether or not
people are filming a rain scene outside my window.
So we cannot associate experience types with fixed posterior probabilities
x1, . . . , xn over fixed propositions E1, . . . , En. We must also take into account the
agent’s previous probabilities Pold. But how does a given type of experience,
together with an agent’s previous probabilities Pold, determine the “inputs” to a
Jeffrey update: the evidence partition E1, . . . , En and the associated probabilities
x1, . . . , xn?
This question is sometimes called the input problem for Jeffrey conditional-
ization. It was first raised by Carnap in his 1957 correspondence with Jeffrey
(published in Jeffrey 1975). Carnap reports that he had himself toyed with the
idea of relaxing the classical Bayesian account along Jeffrey’s lines but had given
up because he couldn’t find an answer to the input problem. Since then, nobody
else has found a plausible answer either. It is widely thought that the problem
simply can’t be solved.4
To get a sense of the difficulties, consider a version of the tablecloth scenario
in which you look twice at the cloth in the dimly lit room, from the same point of
view. Suppose your first experience increases your credence in the hypothesis that
the cloth is green from 0.3 to 0.6. Absent unusual background beliefs, your second
experience should not significantly alter your beliefs about the cloth’s colour.
Intuitively, this is because the second experience is in all relevant respects just like
the first and thus provides little new information. By contrast, if you’d had two
equally inconclusive but very different experiences of the cloth, from different
angles perhaps, the second would have carried more weight. The problem is that
these fact about the two experiences may not be recoverable from your credence
prior to each experience together with a specification of the experience. To be
sure, if every experience had a “phenomenal signature” that (a) distinguished it
from all other experiences and (b) was infallibly revealed to everyone who has the
experience, then we could consult your credence function to see if you recently
had the same type of experience. But the whole point of radical probabilism was
that we wanted to do without such phenomenal signatures.5
4. The input problem also arises for standard (“strict”) conditionalization if we don’t
assume that the proposition on which agents conditionalize is directly given by the relevant
experience. For example, Skyrms (1980) points out that the effect of Jeffrey conditionalization
can be mimicked by strict conditionalization on propositions about (posterior) degrees of belief,
so that what you learn for certain in the tablecloth scenario is (say) that you have become 60
percent confident that the tablecloth is green. But where do these 60 percent come from? How
does your experience together with your prior beliefs determine that this is the appropriate
new credence in the tablecloth being green?
5. The present point is inspired by Garber (1980), where it is used to argue against a partic-
ular answer to the input problem suggested in Field (1978). Hawthorne (2004) presents a model
that gets around the problem by making the input parameters to Jeffrey conditionalization
depend not only on present experience and old probabilities, but also on earlier experiences;
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Jeffrey, in any case, never gave an answer to the input problem. His radical
probabilism is silent on how perceptual experiences together with previous beliefs
and possibly other factors yield new probabilities x1, . . . , xn over a partition
E1, . . . , En such that probabilities conditional on the partition cells are preserved.
All Jeffrey says is that if somehow or other this happens, then the new probabilities
ought to result from the old ones by the relevant instance of Jeffrey conditioning.
But that much is a simple consequence of the probability calculus. Jeffrey’s
account therefore doesn’t provide a substitute for conditionalization as the second
norm of Bayesian epistemology. His alternative threatens to collapse into the first
norm, probabilistic coherence.
This leaves a serious gap in Bayesian epistemology (as noted by Carnap and
reiterated, e.g., in Field 1978 and Christensen 1992). The demands of epistemic
rationality go well beyond probabilistic coherence. There are substantive norms on
how one’s beliefs may change through perception.6 For example, when a chemist
uses a litmus strip to test whether a solution is basic or acidic, they are not free to
change their beliefs in any way they please in response to the outcome. Likewise,
my visual experience of the rain supports the hypothesis that it is raining, but not
that it is snowing or that Tycho Brahe was poisoned by Johannes Kepler. (“How
do you know?”—“I looked through the window”.)
Even if there were no such norms, we would have a gap in Bayesian psychology.
A psychological model of rational agents should have something to say on how
belief states change under the impact of perceptual experience. If this could not
be done within the Bayesian framework, we should conclude that something is
wrong with the framework. But the problem isn’t internal to Bayesianism. The
general problem, illustrated by examples like the repeated tablecloth experience,
is that if beliefs only pertain to ordinary external-world propositions, then the rational
impact of a perceptual experience on an agent’s beliefs is not determined by the nature of
the experience, her previous beliefs, and the environment. Something else plays a role.
We need to know what it is and how it works.
the dynamics of rational credence is thereby rendered unattractively non-Markovian. Further
(though related) challenges to solving the input problem arise from the holistic character of
evidential support; see Christensen (1992), Weisberg (2009), Wagner (2013), and the discussion
of parochialism in Jeffrey (1988). The basic worry here is that if probabilities are only defined
over ordinary external-world propositions, then it may be impossible to find a non-trivial
evidence partition E1, . . . , En that screens off the experience from all other propositions in the
sense that Pnew(A/Ei) = Pold(A/Ei). Weisberg (2009) also points out that a result in Wagner
(2002) seems to entail that the failed proposal of Field (1978) is the only systematic answer to
the input problem that satisfies a desirable commutativity condition (roughly, that it makes no
difference to the final probabilities which of two experiences arrives first).
6. Jeffrey agreed; see especially Jeffrey (1970).
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2. Armchair Robotics
To make progress on the problem raised in the previous section, it may help
to change perspectives and think about how we would design an ideal agent.
Imagine we are to build a robot whose task is to find certain objects—mushrooms
perhaps, or tennis balls, or landmines. To this end, the robot has a database in
which it can store probabilistic information about the environment. It also has
sense organs to receive new information. How should the probabilities in the
database change in response to activities in the sense organs?
A sense organ is a physical device whose internal state systematically and
reliably varies with certain features of the environment. Let’s assume our robot
has a visual sense organ consisting of a two-dimensional array of photoreceptors,
like in the human eye. When hit by light of suitable wavelengths, each photorecep-
tor produces an electrical signal. Different colours, shapes and arrangements of
objects in the environment give rise to different patterns of light waves activating
the photoreceptors, which in turn lead to different signals produced by the sense
organ—that is, to different patterns of electrochemical activity in the “output”
wires of the device.
It would be convenient if one could read off the exact colours, shapes, and
spatial arrangement of objects in the environment from the signal produced by
the robot’s sense organ. In practice, this is not possible, because different config-
urations of the environment lead to the very same activation of photoreceptors
and thus to the very same sensory signal: a small cube nearby can cause the very
same signal as a larger cube further away; a convex shape with light from above
can cause the same signal as a concave shape with light from below; a red cube
under white light can cause the same signal as a white cube under red light; and
so on.
So the functional architecture of a sense organ only determines, for each sen-
sory signal S, a range of alternative hypotheses about the environment E1, . . . , En
that could be responsible for S. Typically, some of these environmental conditions
will be much more common than others. If our robot traverses the surface of the
Earth, it will mostly find itself in situations where roughly white light is coming
roughly from above. Nevertheless, the robot arguably shouldn’t become certain
that a particular one of E1, . . . , En obtains, giving zero probability to all the others.
A better idea is to implement a form of Jeffrey conditionalization, where the new
probabilities x1, . . . , xn over E1, . . . , En might reflect something like the ecological
relative frequency or objective chance with which the conditions obtain when the
signal is produced.
But that is still not an optimal solution. The new probability assigned to
the Ei’s should be sensitive not only to the sensory signal (equivalently, to the
upstream activation of photoreceptors) but also to the old probabilities. For
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example, suppose signal S occurs just as often under condition E1 as under E2,
so that the ecological frequencies x1 and x2 are the same. Suppose further that
before the arrival of S the robot has received information that supports E1 over
E2. On the present account, the new signal will wipe out this information, setting
Pnew(E1) = Pnew(E2). This is clearly not ideal. Relatedly, our robot should be able
to learn whether it is in an environment where S generally goes with E1 or E2; in
the present model, the xi values are fixed once and for all.
A better idea, which gets us closer to actual approaches in Artificial Intelli-
gence (see, e.g., Russell & Norvig 2010: Chapters 15 and 17), is to fix not the
probability of Ei given S, but the inverse probability of S given Ei. That is, let’s
endow our robot with a “sensor model” that defines a probability measure pi over
possible signals S conditional on possible world states Ei. The new probabilities
over the world states can then be computed by a variant of Bayes’ Theorem:
Pnew(Ei) =
pi(S/Ei)Pold(Ei)
∑j pi(S/Ej)Pold(Ej)
.
Note that Pnew(Ei) is sensitive to Pold(Ei), as desired.
Ideally, the sensor model should not be fixed once and for all either. Ignoring
matters of computational tractability, this problem is easily patched by merging
the sensor model pi into the robot’s main probability function P. That is, we
extend the domain of P by the set of possible sensory signals, and define pi(S/Ei)
as Pold(S/Ei). Intuitively, we assume that our robot has opinions about what kinds
of signals it is likely to receive in what kinds of environments. These opinions
can themselves change through sensory experience.
If we replace pi(S/Ei) in the above variant of Bayes’ Theorem by Pold(S/Ei),
then Pnew(Ei) is simply Pold(Ei/S). Moreover, Jeffrey conditionalizing on a par-
tition E1, . . . , En whose new probabilities x1, . . . , xn are given by Pold(E1/S), . . . ,
Pold(En/S), respectively, is equivalent to strict conditionalization on S. So we
might as well bypass the evidence partition E1, . . . , En and simply say that for all
A,
Pnew(A) = Pold(A/S).
The new probability of any proposition A is the old probability of A conditional
on the current sensory signal. Our robot has become a classical (“strict”) con-
ditionalizer. What it conditionalizes on when it receives a sensory signal is not
any of the relevant propositions E1, . . . , En about the environment, but rather the
signal itself.
There’s something odd about this approach. It looks like our robot must
now have well-defined subjective probabilities over sensory signals—over the
occurrence of complicated electrochemical events at the interface of its sense
organs. One might have thought that a robot in search of mushrooms wouldn’t
need to be trained in electrochemistry, and that it wouldn’t need to have perfect
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knowledge about the internal workings of its perceptual system. Indeed, a little
reflection makes clear that this is not required.
Suppose the robot’s probabilities are originally defined only for certain propo-
sitions R about the macroscopic environment. The above considerations suggest
that we need to extend the domain of the probability function by further elements
I such that when a signal S arrives, the robot conditionalizes on a corresponding
proposition ρ(S) ∈ I, where ρ is some function mapping distinct signals to distinct
elements of I. The elements of I thereby “represent” or “denote” electrochemical
events in some causal sense, but this need not in any way be transparent to the
robot or reflected in its probability space. For example, if at some point we wanted
to replace the robot’s photoreceptors with ones that produce different electro-
chemical outputs, we would need to adjust the mapping ρ, but we might not have
to change the content of the robot’s database. Similarly, if we eventually wanted
to train our robot in electrochemistry, the elements of I would still not need to
stand in interesting logical relationships to the electrochemical propositions in
the robot’s belief space.
It may help to imagine that our robot stores information in the form of English
sentences, so that its database associates sentences like ‘there is a mushroom to
the left’ with numbers between 0 and 1. If we restrict the database language to
ordinary sentences about the macroscopic environment, we will run into problems
when we want to specify how the database should be updated in response to
activity in the robot’s sense organs. To optimally deal with sensory input, I
suggest, we need to extend the robot’s probability space by new sentences such
that whenever a sensory signal arrives, the robot becomes certain of one of these
sentences. But there is no good reason why these sentences must be correct and
detailed descriptions of the relevant electrochemical signal. In principle, the
update works just as well if the new sentences are bare tags, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, etc.
I will have more to say on what, if anything, the elements of I represent, and
whether the robot’s probabilities over I should be understood as degrees of belief.
But these are matters of interpretation; they don’t affect the coherence of the
architecture I have outlined.
Formally, the required extension of a probability measure is a straightforward
product construction. Take the simplest case where everything is finite. Let R
be the set of propositions about the environment on which we want the robot
to have an opinion. Probability theory requires that R is a Boolean algebra; so
we can identify each proposition in R with a set of “possible worlds”: the atoms
of the algebra. Now let I be an arbitrary set disjoint from R such that there is a
one-one correspondence between I and the signals the robot can receive.7 Each
7. I is an “arbitrary” set because the identity of its members is irrelevant to the functional
specification of our robot. In this respect, the framework of probability theory is a little artificial,
since it forces us to make a choice.
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pair 〈w, i 〉 of a possible world w and an element i of I is then an atom in the
extended doxastic space; each set of such atoms is a bearer of probability.
Some terminological stipulations will be useful. I will call anything to which
the extended probability measure assigns a value a (complex) proposition. The
members of R are real propositions; subsets of I are imaginary propositions—in
analogy to complex, real, and imaginary numbers, and to highlight the fact that
imaginary propositions do not have to be understood as genuine propositions
about a special subject matter. Individual members of I I will call sense data, since
their role in the present model in some ways resembles the role of sense data in
the classical empiricist model of perception (see Section 4 below). In the robot’s
complex doxastic space, a real proposition A can be re-identified with the set of
atoms 〈w, i 〉 whose possible world coordinate w lies in A; similarly for imaginary
propositions and sense data.
In some respects, the construction of complex propositions is analogous to a
popular construction of centred propositions in the modelling of self-locating beliefs.
Arguably, our doxastic space contains not only propositions about the universe as
a whole, but also propositions about our own current place in the world: an agent
might know every truth about the world from a God’s eye perspective and still
be ignorant about who they are or what time is now (see Lewis 1979). Thus the
atoms in an agent’s doxastic space are often modelled as pairs 〈w, c〉 of a possible
world w and a “centre” c that fixes an individual and a time in w. In the resulting
doxastic space, an objective proposition A about the world is then re-identified
with the set of “centred worlds” 〈w, c〉 whose possible-world coordinate w lies in
A.
In fact, there are good reasons to make the propositions in our robot’s doxastic
space centred as well. Imagine our robot is moving towards a wall. At time t1 it
receives a signal S which (by the robot’s lights) indicates that the wall is about 5
metres away. A little later, at t2, the robot receives another signal S′ indicating
that the wall is about 4 metres away. At this point, we don’t want the robot
to conclude that the wall is most likely both 5 and 4 metres away. Nor should it
conclude that the previous signal was faulty. Rather, it should realize that the first
signal indicated that the wall was 5 metres away at the time, which is perfectly
compatible with the distance now being 4 metres.
Here is how the model I have outlined could be adjusted to accommodate the
passage of time. (The details will not be important for what follows, so feel free to
skip.) First, we make the objects of probabilities centred. So probabilities are now
defined over a three-fold product R × I × T (or a sub-algebra of that product),
where T is a suitable set of relative time indices. Assuming for simplicity that time
is linear and discrete, we might identify T with the set of integers, interpreting 0
as now, 1 as the next point in the future, and so on. When signal S arrives, the robot
conditionalizes not on R× {ρ(S)}, as above, but on R× {ρ(S)} × {0}—intuitively,
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on the indexical proposition that ρ(S) is true now. Such indexical beliefs must be
updated constantly to keep track of the passing time. Thus at the next point in
time, the robot’s certainty of R× {ρ(S)} × {0} should have evolved into certainty
of R× {ρ(S)} × {−1}. ( Intuitively, the robot should now be certain that ρ(S) was
true one moment ago.) These updated probabilities are then conditionalized on
the new evidence R× {ρ(S′)} × {0}. See Schwarz (2017) for further details and
motivation.
3. From the Armchair to Cognitive Science
I have described a model of how subjective probabilities change under the im-
pact of sensory stimulation. The model requires an agent’s doxastic space to
be extended by an “imaginary” dimension whose points are associated with
sensory signals in such a way that when a given signal arrives, the agent assigns
probability 1 to the corresponding imaginary proposition; the probability of any
real proposition is then set to its prior probability conditional on that imaginary
proposition.
As I mentioned in passing, this general approach is hardly new: it closely
resembles standard treatments in artificial intelligence. It is also well-known
in the neuroscience of perception, where similar models have proved a useful
paradigm (see Yuille & Kersten 2006). In these areas, the propositions on which an
agent or her perceptual system is assumed to conditionalize are called ‘percepts’,
‘sense data’, or ‘input strings’, and people rarely pause to reflect on their repre-
sentational features or on what the postulated models imply for the epistemology
of perception.
But it’s worth pausing and reflecting. Suppose, in line with evidence from
cognitive science, that our own cognitive system approximates something like
the model I have described. What would that mean? Would it vindicate classical
empiricist foundationalism? Would it provide an answer to the problems from
Section 1?
To begin, we need to clarify how the extended probability function that
figures in the model should be understood. Does it represent the agent’s degrees
of belief? Unsurprisingly, the answer depends on what we mean by ‘degrees of
belief’. Philosophers often use terms like ‘belief’ or ‘credence’ in a demanding
intellectualist sense tied to conceptual structure, conscious thought, and linguistic
assertion. In that sense, it is doubtful whether cats, dogs, or robots have beliefs.
The model I have described does not assume that the relevant agents have a
language, or that they store information in the form of “conceptually structured
propositions” (whatever that might mean). So the extended probability function
in the model may not fit the job description for intellectualist degrees of belief.
An alternative to the intellectualist conception of belief is a family of function-
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alist conceptions on which belief and other intentional states are defined by their
causal-functional role. On a crude version of this approach (still popular in some
parts of economics), beliefs and desires are defined by an agent’s behavioural
dispositions: to have such-and-such beliefs and desire means to be disposed to
make such-and-such choices. Less crude versions of functionalism identify beliefs
and desires with causally efficacious internal states whose defining functional
role links them not just to behavioural output but also to one another and to
sensory input: to have such-and-such beliefs is to be in some state or other that
bears the right connection to sensory input, to behavioural output, and to other
internal states similarly individuated by their functional role.8
On the functionalist approach, ‘belief’ is implicitly defined by a certain theory,
or model. Different models define somewhat different notions of belief. Let’s
revisit the classical Bayesian model from this perspective.
The Bayesian model assumes that agents have a credence and a utility function.
What does it take for a lump of flesh and blood or silicon to have a particular
credence and utility function? On the functionalist conception, an agent has a
particular credence and utility function just in case she is in some state that plays
the role the model attributes to these functions. One aspect of that role links the
state to the agent’s actual and counterfactual choices: when facing a decision,
standard Bayesianism assumes that an agent chooses an option that maximizes
expected utility in light of her credence and utility function. Another aspect of the
role describes how probabilities and utilities change over time. This is where the
input problem arises. As we saw, it is hard to specify how an agent’s probabilities
should change in response to sensory stimulations (or perceptual experiences, if
you want) if we don’t assume that these provide infallible access to non-trivial
facts about the world.
To get around the input problem, I have suggested that we should extend
the domain of the model’s probability function by extra, “imaginary” elements
associated with sensory signals in such a way that sensory stimulation leads to
conditionalization on the associated imaginary element. So what does it take for
a real agent to have such an extended probability function? As before, the agent
must be in some state or other that plays the functional role the model assigns to
the extended probabilities—to a sufficient degree of approximation.9
8. See , e.g., Lewis (1974), Stalnaker (1984), or Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996) for
classical expositions of this kind of functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
9. A full specification of the relevant functional role would need spell out other controversial
details in the Bayesian model—for example, whether choices should maximize causal or
evidential expected utility. The complete model should also include non-formal constraints on
utilities and probabilities, for the reasons discussed in Lewis (1974) and Lewis (1983): without
such constraints, the model will plausibly allow for too many assignments of probabilities and
utilities, many of which are far removed from what we would intuitively take to be the agent’s
beliefs and desires. I will turn to some such non-formal constraints on extended probabilities
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Even on the functionalist conception, however, there are limits to what one
can sensibly call ‘belief’. If a functional role deviates too far from the role we
ordinarily associate with the word ‘belief’, it would be better to use a different
name. On these grounds, one might argue that an agent’s probabilities over
non-real propositions should not be called ‘credences’ or ‘degrees of belief’. After
all, to have a belief is to represent the world as being a certain way. Beliefs can be
true or false; partial beliefs can be accurate or inaccurate to various degrees. It
is not obvious whether probabilities assigned to imaginary propositions satisfy
these conditions.
One might argue that imaginary propositions represent the corresponding
sensory signals, so that ρ(S) is true iff the relevant signal S is received. From that
perspective, probabilities over imaginary propositions might look like ordinary
degrees of belief; our robot will be interpreted as having sophisticated beliefs
about electrochemistry, albeit under an opaque “mode of presentation”.
I prefer to understand degrees of belief as pertaining directly to ways a world
might be, not to intermediary entities which in turn represent ways a world might
be, perhaps relative to a mode of presentation. More importantly, there is really no
need to assign truth-values to imaginary and complex propositions. In the model I
have described, the purpose of having probabilities assigned to these propositions
is not to represent special information about the world. Rather, the extended
probabilities encode the agent’s dispositions to change her (genuine) beliefs about
the world in response to sensory input. For example, what is encoded by our
robot’s assigning greater probability to A & ρ(S) than to ¬A& ρ(S) is (to a large
part) that receiving S would make the robot assign greater probability to A than
to ¬A.
So there are reasons to not call an agent’s probabilities over imaginary propo-
sitions ‘degrees of belief’. An agent’s degrees of belief, on that usage, are the real
part of her subjective probability function. These degrees of belief do not evolve
by strict conditionalization, since the relevant sense data are not in the domain of
the belief function. Instead, they typically evolve by Jeffrey conditionalization.
This is because the redistribution of an agent’s probabilities over real propositions
brought about by conditionalizing the extended probability function on a sense
datum IS can usually be modelled as an instance of Jeffrey conditionalization.
Concretely, assume that {E1, . . . , En} is some partition of real propositions that
“screens off” the sense datum IS from any other real proposition—meaning that
Pold(A/Ei ∧ IS) = Pold(A/Ei) for any real A and any Ei ∈ {E1, . . . , En}. The agent’s
degrees of belief then change by Jeffrey conditionalization on {E1, . . . , En}, with
the new credences x1, . . . , xn set by Pold(E1/SI), . . . , Pold(En/SI), respectively. If
the agent’s real probability space is finite, there will always be some such partition
in a moment.
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(in the worst case, the partition of individual worlds).10
The model I have outlined therefore provides an answer to the input problem,
insofar as we can explain how a given experience together with an agent’s prior
cognitive state determines the input parameters to a Jeffrey update—provided that
the “prior cognitive state” includes an extended probability function of the kind I
described. If we only look at the agent’s prior probabilities over real propositions,
the problem can’t be solved: there is no fixed way in which perceptual experiences
should affect an agent’s beliefs about the world.
To illustrate how the present model gets around the problems from Sec-
tion 1, imagine our robot finds itself in the repeated tablecloth scenario. Let
S be the perceptual signal the robot receives both times when it looks at the
cloth in the dimly lit room, and let IS be the sense datum associated with S.
Let’s say the robot initially assigned probability 1/3 to each of the possibilities
{Red,Green, Blue}. Moreover, let’s assume it assigned greater probability to IS
conditional on Green than to IS conditional on Red or Blue. Concretely, let’s as-
sume that Pold(IS/Green) = 1/4 and Pold(IS/Red) = Pold(IS/Blue) = 1/8. As you
can check, the robot’s new probabilities over {Red,Green, Blue} will then be 1/4,
1/2, 1/4, respectively. At the same time, the robot’s probability for IS increases to 1.
When the robot takes a second look at the cloth from the exact same perspective,
we can assume that its extended probability measure assigns high probability to
the hypothesis that it is going to learn IS again. As a consequence, the second
look at the tablecloth will barely affect the robot’s beliefs about the cloth’s colour.
Here I have made various assumptions about the robot’s prior probabilities.
The formal model alone does not guarantee sensible results. For example, if
the robot assigned high prior probability to IS-now conditional on Red and to
IS-in-a-moment conditional on Blue, the first look at the tablecloth might make
it confident that the cloth is red and the second that the cloth is blue. In this
respect, the present model is on a par with the classical Bayesian model in which
beliefs evolve by strict conditionalization. That, too, leads to sensible posterior
beliefs only if the agent starts out with sensible prior beliefs. I will return to
the “problem of the priors” in the next section. First I want to discuss another
important caveat.
Bayesian models of rationality are often highly idealized. The model I have
described certainly is. Such idealized models can still be useful, and not just
as normative ideals. Even if they don’t fit all the phenomena, they can capture
important patterns in the phenomena—central aspects of our psychology, ignoring
friction and air resistance, as it were. On the other hand, it is also useful to study
10. In the infinite case, we may need to invoke some generalization of Jeffrey’s formula
like the one mentioned in Footnote 2, but there may still be cases where Jeffrey’s model is
inapplicable. Never mind: we have an answer to the problem Jeffrey’s model was meant to
solve.
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how reality deviates from the ideal. Here too one can often find interesting
patterns. In fact, many peculiarities of our cognitive system can arguably be
explained as consequences of the short-cuts evolution has taken to approximate
the model I have described.
If we tried to build our robot, with its central database of probabilities updated
by conditionalizing on sense data, we would quickly hit insurmountable problems.
Conditionalizing a high-dimensional probability measure is a non-trivial, often
intractable computational task. Computer science has come up with several tricks
to make it more tractable. For example, instead of computing exact conditional
probabilities we could employ Monte Carlo sampling (Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenen-
baum 2008) or variational approximations (Seeger & Wipf 2010). Restricting the
mathematical form of prior probabilities also proves useful in this context. Ideas
from predictive coding could be used to exploit regularities in sensory signals
(Clark 2013). It also helps to decompose an agent’s (“joint”) probability measure
into probabilistically independent components, perhaps in the structure of a
Bayes net (Pearl and Russell (2001)). 11 There is evidence that our nervous system
employs these and other tricks to approximate the simple Bayesian ideal – see
Weiss, Simonvelli, and Adelson (2002), Vul, Alvarez, Tenenbaum, and Black (2009),
Sanborn, Griffiths, Navarro, and To (2010), Gershman and Daw (2012), Gershman,
Vul, and Tenenbaum (2012), Howhy (2014), Griffiths, Lieder, and Goodman (2015).
Another respect in which my model is idealized is its assumption of precise
probabilities. This, too, could easily be relaxed. Instead of storing a precise
probability function, we might only store certain constraints on probabilities:
that P is more probable than Q, that R is probabilistically independent from S,
and so on. The agent’s doxastic state would then be represented by a whole set
of probability functions: all those that meet the constraints (Jeffrey 1984). On
closer inspection, however, it is not clear whether imprecise probabilities improve
computational tractability, since standard methods for updating a probability
function (such as Monte Carlo sampling) do not straightforwardly generalize to
sets of probability functions (Zhang, Dai, Beer, & Wang 2013).12 But there are
other reasons to allow for imprecise probabilities. For example, it has been argued
11. In a Bayes net, assumptions of conditional independence are directly reflected in the
structure of the network, which might allow for a more perspicuous identification of the input
partition in a Jeffrey update. Along these lines, Schwan and Stern (2017), drawing on Pearl
(1988), suggest that an agent should Jeffrey conditionalize on a partition {Ei , . . . En} iff every
node A in the network is d-separated from the input node I by the elements Ei of the partition.
Schwan and Stern and Pearl, however, do not treat I as an imaginary element of the agent’s
doxastic space. Rather, they take I to be an ordinary fact about the world of which the agent
could become certain if only it were represented in her doxastic space. In reality, there often
won’t be any such fact I: there is no suitable fact about the world of which my experience of
the rain could rationally make me certain.
12. Thanks here to an anonymous referee.
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that only imprecise credences adequately reflect a certain kind of inconclusive
evidence (Joyce 2005, Sturgeon 2008). These considerations would carry over to
an agent’s extended probability function, suggesting that for many sense data S
and real propositions A, rational agents should not assign a strict probability to S
given A.
One further trick may be worth dwelling on for a little longer. The idea is to
use a two-tiered process in which sensory modules first implement a simplified
version of the model I have outlined to estimate the most probable hypothesis about
the environment in light of the current sensory input. In the second stage, this
hypothesis is then treated as the input signal to adjust the subjective probabilities
that feed into rational action. Computationally, the two-tiered approach has
several advantages. For one thing, the sensory modules can work with simplified,
special purpose probability measures that don’t have to take into account all the
information available to the agent. (We’d effectively return to the “sensor models”
from artificial intelligence.) In addition, it is much easier to find a single plausible
interpretation of an incoming signal—a single guess about the environment—than
to calculate to what extent the signal supports every conceivable hypothesis. Given
the large amount of data our senses constantly receive, it might be prudent for
our sensory modules to focus on this simpler, non-probabilistic task. Producing a
single guess about the environment might have the further advantage of allowing
fast behavioural responses: calculating expected utilities is just as intractable as
conditionalization; it is much easier to act on a single hypothesis.13
Such a two-tiered implementation might help to explain why perceptual
experiences generally seem to present the world as being a particular way. When
I look at the Müller-Lyer illusion, there is a sense in which my visual experience
suggests to me that one line is longer than the other. This is a kind of “perceptual
content” (indeed, it is what philosophers mostly have in mind when they talk
about perceptual content), but it is clearly not what I conditionalize on, since I
do not become certain that one line is longer. I know that the lines are the same
length, but the mechanism that produces the categorical interpretation is not
sensitive to that information.
It is not my aim in the present paper to speculate about how our nervous
system approximates the Bayesian ideal. This is a task for cognitive science. The
above remarks are only meant to illustrate what a more refined model that takes
into account our cognitive limitations might look like, and how the required
compromises might account for salient features of our psychology that are not
predicted by the simple model from the previous section.
13. The intermediate hypothesis produced by the sensory modules need not be a pure,
objective proposition about the environment; it might also involve “imaginary” elements,
locating the present state of the world in a high-dimensional phenomenal space, as (effectively)
suggested, e.g., in Shepard (2001).
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Here it is important not to conflate different levels of modelling. Hypotheses
about the “Bayesian brain” (Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao 2007) are often understood
as conjectures about the internal processes involved in perception and action. The
model I want to defend is largely neutral on these issues. For example, it does
not settle whether perceptual input is processed in classical bottom-up style or in
the more top-down fashion postulated by recent accounts of predictive coding.
The only suggestion I have for lower-level Bayesian models in cognitive
science concerns the interpretation of such models. Cognitive scientists commonly
describe perception as a process of inferring facts about the environment from
sensory stimuli; they talk about the surprisingness of incoming signals, or about
the construction of internal models that predict those signals. Taken literally, this
suggests that our cognitive system is given direct and infallible information about
complicated electrochemical events in its periphery and then faces the task of
explaining or predicting the occurrence of these events (see, e.g., Rieke 1999). Yet
most of us are fairly ignorant of the electrochemical processes in our nervous
system: the infallible basis of our empirical knowledge appears to get lost through
cognitive processing. What I want to suggest is that from the perspective of a
cognitive system, sensory inputs are not represented as electrochemical events, even
though that is what they are. We can distinguish between the inputs themselves
and the corresponding elements in the domain of a system’s probability measure.
What is “given” in perception are not sophisticated facts about neurophysiology,
but imaginary sense-datum propositions that don’t directly settle any substantive
question about the world.
4. Softcore Empiricism
Let me now explore some epistemological consequences of the model I have
outlined. As I mentioned in Section 1, Jeffrey developed his alternative to classical
conditionalization because he rejected the view he called ‘hardcore empiricism’:
that our knowledge of the world rests on a foundation of infallible and indubitable
beliefs about present experience. On the most familiar version of the empiricist
picture, all our knowledge is derived from an infallible perceptual basis, drawing
on a priori connections between the verdicts of experience and statements about
the external world. If the connections are logical, we get the striking phenome-
nalist view that the world (or at least all we can ever know about it) is a logical
construction out of sense data.
The model I have defended bears a superficial similarity to this empiricist
picture: experiences confer absolute certainty on a special class of (“imaginary”)
propositions; beliefs about the external world are then adjusted according to
their prior connections with these propositions. But there are also important
differences.
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First of all, imaginary propositions do not represent true features of the
relevant experiences—at least not in a cognitively transparent way. They do not
distinguish real ways the world could be at all. (No wonder they can never
turn out to be false.) As a corollary, there are no intrinsic logical or analytical
connections between imaginary propositions and real propositions. To get from
sense data to claims about the world, we need external bridge principles, encoded
in our prior (conditional) probabilities.
In this way, the model is tailored to accommodate the holism of confirmation.
Whether sensory information E supports a genuine hypothesis H about the world
always depends on the agent’s background beliefs. Depending on the prior
probabilities, the very same experience can rationally lead to very different beliefs.
There is no once-and-for-all right or wrong interpretation of sensory signals.
The only propositions that are directly and unrevisably supported by sensory
experience are imaginary propositions without real empirical content.
Second, the model I have put forward is not committed to an ontology of
sense data or irreducible phenomenal properties. Relatedly, it makes no claims
about what we see (or hear or taste), or about what we are directly aware of in
experience. Surely what we see are in general such things as trees and tables
and tigers. Nothing I have said suggests that that we also, or primarily, see
non-physical ideas, impressions, or sense-data.
Third, the model I have outlined does not assume that perceivers have special
introspective access to imaginary propositions, nor does it assume that imaginary
propositions are objects of “belief” in the intellectualist sense that dominates
discussions in epistemology. The claim is not that whenever we have a perceptual
experience, we become certain of a special “observation sentence” from which we
then deduce other, perhaps probabilistic, statements about the world. Condition-
alization is not an inference, with premises and conclusion, and it is not supposed
to be a conscious, deliberate activity. Perceivers don’t need words or concepts
that capture the imaginary content of their perceptions, and they don’t need to
conceptualize their experiences as reasons for their beliefs. As Sellars (1956) and
others have pointed out, these commitments render the foundationalist picture
highly unappealing.
If we focus on the intellectualist sense of ‘belief’ it is hard to explain the
epistemic impact of perceptual experience. Since perceptions don’t seem to have
the required sentence-like, “conceptual” content, how can they support or justify
beliefs with that kind of content? Is the link between perception and belief
merely causal, outside the domain of epistemology? That also seems wrong, for
there clearly are rational constraints on how one’s beliefs may change through
perceptual experience. Again, scientists are not free to change their beliefs in any
way they please when observing a litmus paper that has turned red.
To make progress on these issues, we should accept that epistemology is not
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confined to intellectualist belief. The functionalist notion of belief (or credence)
popular in the Bayesian tradition brings us one step further, but it still doesn’t
reach far enough, at least if we restrict it to real propositions about the world.
As I’ve argued in Sections 1 and 2, how an agent’s representation of the world
should change under the impact of perceptual experience is not a function of
the experience and the agent’s representation of the world before the experience.
Something else plays a role. In the model I have described, that something else is
represented by the agent’s extended probabilities.
So what I’m advocating is not a rebranding of classical empiricist foundation-
alism. In many respects, the model I want to advertise looks more like Jeffrey’s
“softcore empiricism”: it offers a systematic account of how perceptions affect
rational attitudes about the world, without making the agent certain of any sub-
stantive propositions, and without assuming any fixed probabilistic connection
between experiences and propositions about the world.
This brings me back to the problem of priors. Suppose you’re a scientist and
you’ve just observed a litmus strip turning red. Absent unusual background
assumptions, you should become confident that the strip is red and the tested
substance acidic. Why is that? The model I have put forward does not give an
answer. It only says that your new probability in the strip being red should equal
your previous probability conditional on the imaginary proposition associated
with your experience. But why should that conditional probability be high?
Now, one advantage of the model I have proposed is that the relevant con-
ditional probabilities can themselves be adjusted through learning. So we can
explain why the effect of your visual experience is sensitive to background infor-
mation about the workings of litmus stripts, the present lighting conditions, or
your eye sight. But that doesn’t fully answer the question. Suppose (unrealisti-
cally, of course) that your probabilities evolved from an ultimate prior probability
function by successive conditionalization on sensory evidence. Would that au-
tomatically make your probabilities epistemically rational? Arguably not. With
sufficiently deviant ultimate priors, your entire history of perception could lead
to a state in which you treat the experience of the red litmus paper as strong
evidence that the paper is blue (or that Tycho Brahe was poisoned by Johannes
Kepler). So there must be substantive, non-formal constraints even on ultimate
priors—equivalently, on what one may believe in light of an entire history of
sensory input.
How tight are these constraints? Some have argued that there is a unique
rational prior, so that rational agents with the same history of sensory input
would always arrive at the same credences (e.g., White 2005). Others disagree
(e.g., Meacham 2014). The approach I want to advertize is compatible with either
position. I do assume, however, that there are some non-formal constraints on
ultimate priors.
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Where do these constraints come from? It is doubtful that they could be
defended by non-circular a priori reasoning. Perhaps they reflect irreducible
epistemic norms. Or perhaps they can be explained as (in some sense) constitutive
of the relevant intentional states: perhaps what makes it the case that a given
brain state is a belief that we’re looking at something red is in part that the state
is normally caused by perceptions of red things. Alternatively, we might try to
vindicate some constraints by objective, external correlations. Suppose sensory
stimulus S is triggered mostly under external circumstances C, and robustly so.
Then we might say that S objectively supports C. More generally, if the objective
chance of C given S is x, we might say that S objectively supports C to degree x.
And so we might say that a subject is justified in assigning conditional credence
x to C given ρ(S), absent relevant evidence, iff x matches the degree to which S
objectively supports C (see Dunn 2015, Tang 2016, and Pettigrew in press).
Most of these issues and options are familiar from contemporary discussions
in epistemology. The model I have suggested does little to resolve them. What it
does is provide a credible background story. The empiricism I’m trying to sell
you does not presuppose an outdated, 18th century view of perception and the
mind. On the contrary, it naturally goes with 21st century cognitive science.
5. Puzzles of Consciousness
Before concluding, I want to explore one further application of my model, to the
puzzle of conscious experience.
I have suggested that terms like ‘credence’ or ‘belief’ might be reserved for
an agent’s attitudes towards real propositions, since the non-real part of an
agent’s probability function does not serve a straightforwardly representational
function. But this difference between real and imaginary propositions need not
be transparent to the agent. An agent’s cognitive system need not draw a sharp
line between the two kinds of attitudes. Our robot, for example, does not need a
special database for real propositions in addition to its database for imaginary
(and complex) propositions. From the robot’s perspective, it might simply appear
as if reality had an extra dimension, an extra respect of similarity and difference.
Perceptual experience will then appear to convey direct and certain information
about this aspect of reality, and only uncertain information about everything
else. Conversely, ordinary information about the world will never suffice to fix
the apparent further dimension of reality: there may be no conjunction of real
propositions conditional on which any sense datum proposition has probability 1.
The robot may then be tempted to conclude that physics is incomplete, that there
are special phenomenal facts revealed through experience that are not implied by
or reducible to physical facts about the arrangement and dynamics of matter. Yet
our robot could well exist in a completely physical world.
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Perhaps we all are in a position not unlike my robot. Our perceptual expe-
riences do appear to convey a special kind of information that is more certain
than our ordinary beliefs about the world. To illustrate, consider your present
perceptual experience. Are there any possibilities you can conclusively rule out
in virtue of having this experience? Don’t think of this as an attitude towards a
sentence. Rather, imagine different ways things could be and ask yourself whether
any of them can be ruled out given your experience. For example, consider a
scenario in which you are skiing—a normal skiing scenario, without systematic
hallucinations, rewired brains, evil demons or the like. It could be a real situation
from the past, if you ever went skiing. Your experiences in that situation are
completely unlike your actual present experiences. (I trust you are not reading
this paper while skiing.) In the skiing scenario, you see the snow-covered slopes
ahead of you, feel the icy wind in your face, the ground passing under your skis,
and so on. What is your credence that this situation is actual right now? Arguably
zero. In general, when we have a given experience, it seems that we can rule out
any situations in which we have a sufficiently different experience. That is why
skeptical scenarios almost always hold fixed our experiences and only vary the
rest of the world.
These intuitions put pressure on physicalist accounts of experience. If experi-
ences are brain states, and we can always rule out situations in which we have
different experiences, it would seem to follow that merely in virtue of being in a
given brain state we can rule out situations where we are in different brain states.
That seems wrong. As Lewis put it, “making discoveries in neurophysiology is
not so easy!” (1995: 329). Lewis concludes that physicalists should reject the folk
psychological Identification Thesis, that when we have an experience of a certain
type, we can rule out possibilities in which we have experiences of a different
type.
The model I have put forward suggests a different response. Both the reading
experience and the skiing experience are associated with imaginary propositions
in your extended doxastic space—the propositions of which the relevant experi-
ence would make you certain. When you entertain the hypothesis that you are
in the skiing scenario, what you entertain includes certain imaginary proposi-
tions. And these propositions are incompatible with the imaginary propositions
associated with the reading experience: their conjunction is the empty proposi-
tion. Hence the reading experience allows you to conclusively rule out the skiing
scenario—not by its physical features, but by its “imaginary features”, so to speak.
Along the same lines we can explain other phenomena that seem to put
pressure on physicalism. Consider Mary (from Jackson 1982), who has learned
all physical facts about colours and colour vision without having seen colours. If
Mary’s probability space has an imaginary dimension, her physical knowledge
may still leave open many possibilities along the imaginary dimension. For
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example, let IR be an imaginary proposition associated in Mary’s cognitive system
with experiences of whatever physical type X is typically caused by looking at
red things. In Mary’s extended probability space, this association will plausibly
be contingent: P(IR/X)  1. So when she is eventually presented with some
coloured chips, without being told their colour, Mary will become certain of IR,
but she won’t be able to tell that she is in physical state X. Conversely, if she
learns that she will be in state X tomorrow, this will leave her uncertain about
IR-tomorrow. All this will be so even if Mary lives in a completely physical world.
Similarly, if IR is an imaginary proposition associated with red experiences,
and P is the totality of all physical truths, we can explain why both P& IR
and P&¬IR are a priori conceivable (see Chalmers 2009), even if the world is
completely physical.
In short, the phenomena that appear to support dualism about consciousness
might be artefacts of the way we process sensory information.
To be clear, the model I have outlined makes no direct claims about conscious-
ness. I never mentioned consciousness when I introduced the model. Indeed,
empirical evidence (e.g., about binocular rivalry, see Blake & Logothetis 2002)
makes clear that our conscious experience does not simply track the stimulation
patterns in our sense organs. Consciousness rather seems to play a role in some-
thing like the two-stage processing about which I speculated in Section 3. There
I suggested that our sensory systems might compute a single (coarse-grained)
hypothesis about the environment which is then turned into an input signal for
personal-level probabilities (as well as driving immediate behavioural reactions).
Clearly, this is mere speculation. I have no qualified views on the functional
role of consciousness in our cognitive architecture, and I don’t claim that my
model makes much progress on this issue—on what Chalmers (1995) calls the
“easy problem” of consciousness. But it might help with the “hard problem”,
the problem of explaining how physical processes in the brain seem to create
a phenomenon that can’t be understood in physical or functional terms at all.
My suggestion is that, for reasons to do with the efficient processing of sensory
signals, our subjective picture of the world has an added dimension which makes
it appear as if perceptual experiences carry a special kind of information that goes
beyond physical and functional information.
I want to close with one more puzzle about consciousness that has not received
much attention.14 The puzzle is the apparent fit between the phenomenal character
of mental states and their functional role. To see what I mean, compare again the
skiing experience with your present reading experience. Both experiences have
a distinctive phenomenal character. For the skiing experience, this involves the
phenomenology of feeling the wind, seeing the slopes, moving your legs, and
so on. My claim is that this phenomenal character goes well with the external
14. Latham (2000) discusses a version of the puzzle.
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circumstances that cause the experience and with the behaviour it causes. Imagine
a world where the phenomenal characters are swapped, where ordinary skiing
events are associated with the actual phenomenology of reading a paper, and vice
versa. That would be a world where phenomenal character doesn’t fit functional
role.
Are “inverted qualia” worlds like this conceivable? Not if the phenomenal
truths are a priori entailed by broadly physical truths. But many philosophers—
physicalists and dualists alike—deny the thesis of a priori entailment. They hold
that there is an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. This
suggests that worlds with thoroughly inverted qualia should be epistemically
possible.15 Epistemically speaking, it is then just a coincidence that in our world
phenomenology nicely fits functional role. For all we know a priori, it could have
been that skiing experiences are associated with the phenomenology of reading
philosophy papers. Or it could have been that everyone’s phenomenology is
running two hours late, so that, when people eat breakfast and listen to the news
in the morning, they have the experience of still sleeping; when they have started
working, they have the experience of eating breakfast and listening to the news,
and so on. How convenient that we don’t live in a world like that! (If indeed we
don’t. For can we really be sure?)
This is the puzzle. Here is the solution. In our extended doxastic space,
imaginary propositions are compatible with many, perhaps all, real propositions.
There are points in our doxastic space where the imaginary proposition actually
associated with skiing stimulations is conjoined with a reading scenario. On
the other hand, in order for perception to provide us with information about
the world, there must be strong a priori constraints on the interpretation of
sensory signals and thus on the probabilities of real propositions conditional
on imaginary propositions. (Recall the discussion of non-formal constraints in
Section 4.) Absent unusual background information, a specific sense datum must
be regarded as strong evidence for a narrow range of hypotheses about the world.
These connections can change through experience, but the functioning of our
perceptual system demands that we give low a priori probability to possibilities
where a given type of experience—as represented by the associated imaginary
propositions—is caused by an unusual environment. The above inverted qualia
scenarios are extreme cases of this type. The model I have outlined suggests that
15. Strictly speaking, one could deny that the phenomenal is entailed by the physical but
also deny the coherence of the described scenario. The idea would be that there is partial
entailment from the physical to the phenomenal: given a state’s physical and functional
properties, one can a priori rule out many candidate phenomenal properties; the entailment
is partial because more than one candidate is left standing. However, most philosophers who
believe in an explanatory gap believe that the gap is fairly wide, so that physical information
entails very little about phenomenal character. As long as the gap is sufficiently wide, we can
construct strange inversion scenarios, even if not the exact scenario from above.
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they must have negligible prior probability. They are almost a priori ruled out.
6. Conclusion
Much of what we know about the world we know through perception. But how
does perception provide us with that knowledge? Perceptual experiences do not
seem to deliver direct and certain information about the external world. The
classical empiricists held that perceptual experience instead delivers information
about an internal world of sense data, from which we infer hypotheses about
the external world. But the idea of a luminous internal world is hard to square
with a naturalistic picture of cognition and our general fallibility. A more sober
response rejects the assumption that rational belief requires a bedrock of certainty:
perceptions may increase or decrease the credibility of various external-world
hypotheses without rendering anything certain. Unfortunately, once we try to fill
in the details, this response runs into serious problems. It seems that an agent’s
belief state prior to a given experience does not contain enough information to
settle how the beliefs should change through the experience.
I have proposed a way out that takes a step back towards the old empiricist
account. In order to adequately respond to sensory stimulation, I have argued, it
may be useful to extend the domain of an agent’s subjective probability function
by an “imaginary” dimension whose points are associated with sensory signals in
such a way that when a signal S arrives, a corresponding “imaginary proposition”
ρ(S) becomes certain; the probability of real propositions is then adjusted in ac-
cordance with their prior probability conditional on ρ(S). The space of imaginary
propositions plays an epistemological role somewhat analogous to the empiricist’s
internal world. In Section 5, I have suggested that the similarities might go further
insofar as imaginary propositions might correspond to the phenomenal properties
that appear to present themselves to us in perception.
The model I have presented is abstract and formal. It does not settle that—
let alone explain why—a given type of red experience should make an agent
confident that she confronts something red. Nor does it imply any particular
algorithm or mechanism for computing the new probabilities. As such, it remains
neutral on many contentious and difficult questions in epistemology and cognitive
science. Nonetheless, it may provide a useful background for tackling some of
the more substantive questions in these areas.
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